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Abstract
The worst-case training principle that minimizes the maximal adversarial loss, also
known as adversarial training (AT), has shown to be a state-of-the-art approach for
enhancing adversarial robustness against norm-ball bounded input perturbations.
Nonetheless, min-max optimization beyond the purpose of AT has not been rigor-
ously explored in the research of adversarial attack and defense. In particular, given
a set of risk sources (domains), minimizing the maximal loss induced from the
domain set can be reformulated as a general min-max problem that is different from
AT, since the maximization is taken over the probability simplex of the domain set.
Examples of this general formulation include attacking model ensembles, devising
universal perturbation to input samples or data transformations, and generalized AT
over multiple norm-ball threat models. We show that these problems can be solved
under a unified and theoretically principled min-max optimization framework. Our
proposed approach leads to substantial performance improvement over the uniform
averaging strategy in four different tasks. Moreover, we show how the self-adjusted
weighting factors of the probability simplex from our proposed algorithms can be
used to explain the importance of different attack and defense models.
1 Introduction
Training a machine learning model that is capable of assuring its worst-case performance against
all possible adversaries given a specified threat model is a fundamental yet challenging problem,
especially for deep neural networks (DNNs) [1–3]. A common practice to train an adversarially robust
model is based on a specific form of min-max training, known as adversarial training (AT) [2, 4],
where the minimization step learns model weights that confine the adversarial loss induced from the
maximization step in an alternative training fashion. On datasets such as MNIST and CIFAR-10, AT
has achieved the state-of-the-art defense performance against `p-norm-ball input perturbations [5].
Motivated by the success of AT, one follow-up question that naturally arises is: Beyond AT, can
other types of min-max formulation and optimization techniques advance the research in adversarial
robustness? In this paper, we give an affirmative answer corroborated by the substantial performance
gain and the ability of self-learned risk interpretation using our proposed min-max framework on
several tasks for adversarial attack and defense.
We demonstrate the utility of a general formulation for min-max optimization minimizing the
maximal loss induced from a set of risk sources (domains). Our considered min-max formulation
is fundamentally different from AT, as our maximization step in taken over the probability simplex
of the set of domains. Moreover, we show that many problem setups in adversarial attacks and
defenses can in fact be reformulated under this general min-max framework, including attacking
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model ensembles [6, 7], devising universal perturbation to input samples [8] or data transformations
[9, 10], and generalized AT over multiple types of threat models [11, 12]. However, current methods
for solving these tasks often rely on simple heuristics (e.g., uniform averaging), resulting in significant
performance drops when comparing to our proposed min-max optimization framework.
Specifically, based on the general min-max framework, we also show that these problems can be
solved under the same optimization procedure and prove the rate of its algorithmic convergence. As a
byproduct and an exclusive feature, by tracking the weighting factor associated with the probability
simplex during training, our method can provide tools for self-adjusted risk assessment and obtain
novel insights on the set of domains for the associated tasks.
Contributions (1) We indicate the utility of min-max optimization beyond AT by proposing a
general and theoretically grounded framework on adversarial attack and defense. (2) We demonstrate
the effectiveness of our min-max framework by evaluating the proposed APGD attack on MNIST
and CIFAR-10. In theory, we prove that APGD has O(1/T ) converges rate, where T is number of
iterations. In practice, we show that APGD obtains 40.79%, 35.21% and 9.39% improvement on
average compared with PGD attack. (3) We propose a generalized AT scheme under mixed types of
adversarial attacks. Compared with vanilla AT, our new training scheme leads to better worst-case
robustness even if the defender lacks prior knowledge of the strengths of attacks. (4) We show how
the weighting factors of the probability simplex help to obtain novel insights for associated tasks and
interpreting the importance of candidates in domains.
Related Work Recent studies have identified that DNNs are highly vulnerable to adversarial
manipulations in various applications [1, 13–22], thus leading to an arms race between adversarial
attacks [3, 5, 23–27] and defenses [4, 28–31]. One intriguing property of adversarial examples is the
transferability across multiple domains [32–35], which indicates a more challenging yet promising
research direction – devising universal adversarial perturbations over model ensembles [6, 7], input
samples [8, 36] and data transformations [5, 9, 10]. However, current approaches suffer from a
significant performance loss for resting on the uniform averaging strategy. We will compare these
works with our min-max method in Sec. 4. As a natural extension following min-max attack, we
study the generalized AT under multiple perturbations as two independent works [11, 12] of the same
time but providing a unique solution. Finally, our min-max framework is adapted and inspired by
previous literature on robust learning over multiple domains [37–40].
2 Min-Max Power in Adversarial Attack and Defense
We begin by introducing the principle of robust learning over multiple domains and its connection to
a specialized form of min-max optimization. Then we show that the resulting min-max formulation
fits into various attack settings including a) ensemble adversarial attack, b) universal adversarial
perturbation and c) robust perturbation over data transformations. Furthermore, we propose a
generalized AT framework under mixed types of adversarial attacks.
2.1 General idea: Robust learning over multiple domains
Consider K loss functions {Fi(v)} (each of which is defined on a learning domain), the problem of
robust learning over K domains can be formulated as [37–39]
minimize
v∈V
maximize
w∈P
∑K
i=1 wiFi(v), (1)
where v and w are optimization variables, V is a constraint set, and P denotes the probability simplex
P = {w |1Tw = 1, wi ∈ [0, 1],∀i}. Since the inner maximization problem in (1) is a linear function
of w over the probabilistic simplex, problem (1) is thus equivalent to
minimize
v∈V
maximize
i∈[K]
Fi(v), (2)
where [K] denotes the integer set {1, 2, . . . ,K}.
Benefit and computation challenge of (1) Compared to multi-task learning in a finite-sum formu-
lation which minimizes K losses on average, problem (1) provides consistently robust worst-case
performance across all domains. This can be explained from the epigraph form of (2),
minimize
v∈V,t
t, subject to Fi(v) ≤ t, i ∈ [K], (3)
where t is an epigraph variable [41] that provides the t-level robustness at each domain.
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Although the min-max problem (1) offers a great robustness interpretation as in (3), solving it
becomes more challenging than solving the finite-sum problem. It is clear from (2) that the inner
maximization problem of (1) always returns the one-hot value of w, namely, w = ei, where ei is the
ith standard basis vector, and i = arg maxi{Fi(v)}. The one-hot coding reduces the generalizability
to other domains and induces instability of the learning procedure in practice. Such an issue is often
mitigated by introducing a strongly concave regularizer in the inner maximization step [39, 37].
Regularized problem formulation Spurred by [37], we penalize the distance between the worst-
case loss and the average loss over K domains. This yields
minimize
v∈V
maximize
w∈P
∑K
i=1 wiFi(v)− γ2 ‖w − 1/K‖22, (4)
where γ > 0 is a regularization parameter. As γ → 0, problem (4) is equivalent to (1). By contrast,
it becomes the finite-sum problem when γ → ∞ since w → 1/K. In this sense, the trainable w
provides an essential indicator on the importance level of each domain. The larger the weight is,
the more important the domain is. We call w domain weights in this paper. We next show how the
principle of robust learning over multiple domains can fit into various settings of adversarial attack
and defense problems.
2.2 Robust adversarial attacks
The general goal of adversarial attack is to craft an adversarial example x′ = x0 + δ ∈ Rd to mislead
the prediction of machine learning (ML) or deep learning (DL) systems, where x0 denotes the natural
example with the true label t0, and δ is known as adversarial perturbation, commonly subject to
`p-norm (p ∈ {0, 1, 2,∞}) constraint X := {δ | ‖δ‖p ≤ , x0 + δ ∈ [0, 1]d} for a given small
number . Here the `p norm enforces the similarity between x′ and x0, and the input space of ML/DL
systems is normalized to [0, 1]d.
Ensemble attack over multiple models Consider K ML/DL models {Mi}Ki=1, the goal is to find
robust adversarial examples that can fool all K models simultaneously. In this case, the notion of
‘domain’ in (4) is specified as ‘model’, and the objective function Fi in (4) signifies the attack loss
f(δ;x0, y0,Mi) given the natural input (x0, y0) and the modelMi. Thus, problem (4) becomes
minimize
δ∈X
maximize
w∈P
∑K
i=1 wif(δ;x0, y0,Mi)− γ2 ‖w − 1/K‖22, (5)
where w encodes the difficulty level of attacking each model.
Universal perturbation over multiple examples Consider K natural examples {(xi, yi)}Ki=1 and
a single modelM, our goal is to find the universal perturbation δ so that all the corruptedK examples
can foolM. In this case, the notion of ‘domain’ in (4) is specified as ‘example’, and problem (4)
becomes
minimize
δ∈X
maximize
w∈P
∑K
i=1 wif(δ;xi, yi,M)− γ2 ‖w − 1/K‖22, (6)
where different from (5), w encodes the difficulty level of attacking each example.
Adversarial attack over data transformations Consider K categories of data transformation
{pi}, e.g., rotation, lightening, and translation [42], our goal is to find the adversarial attack that
is robust to data transformations. In this case, the notion of ‘domain’ in (4) is specified as ‘data
transformer’, and problem (4) becomes
minimize
δ∈X
maximize
w∈P
∑K
i=1 wiEt∼pi [f(t(x0 + δ); y0,M)]− γ2 ‖w − 1/K‖22, (7)
where Et∼pi [f(t(x0+δ); y0,M)] denotes the attack loss under the distribution of data transformation
pi, and w encodes the difficulty level of attacking each type of transformed example x0.
2.3 Adversarial training (AT) under mixed types of adversarial attacks
Conventional AT is restricted to a single type of norm-ball constrained adversarial attack [4]. For
example, AT under `∞ attack yields
minimize
θ
E(x,y)∈D maximize‖δ‖∞≤
ftr(θ, δ;x, y), (8)
where θ ∈ Rn denotes model parameters, δ denotes -tolerant `∞ attack, and ftr(θ, δ;x, y) is the
training loss under perturbed examples {(x+ δ, y)}. However, there possibly exist blind attacking
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spots across multiple types of adversarial attacks so that AT under one attack would not be strong
enough against another attack [11, 12]. Thus, an interesting question is how to generalize AT under
multiple types of adversarial attacks. One possible way is to use the finite-sum formulation
minimize
θ
E(x,y)∈D maximize{δi∈Xi}
1
K
K∑
i=1
ftr(θ, δi;x, y), (9)
where δi ∈ Xi is the ith type of adversarial perturbation defined on Xi, e.g., different `p attacks.
Moreover, one can map ‘attack type’ to ‘domain’ considered in (1). We then perform AT against the
strongest adversarial attack across K attack types in order to avoid blind attacking spots [12]. That is,
upon defining Fi(θ) := maximizeδi∈Xi ftr(θ, δi;x, y), we solve the problem of the form (2),
minimize
θ
E(x,y)∈D maximize
i∈[K]
Fi(θ). (10)
In fact, problem (10) is in the min-max-max form, however, Lemma 1 shows that problem (10) can
be further simplified to the min-max form.
Lemma 1. Problem (10) is equivalent to
minimize
θ
E(x,y)∈D maximize
w∈P,{δi∈Xi}
K∑
i=1
wif(θ, δi;x, y), (11)
where w ∈ RK represent domain weights, and P has been defined in (1).
Proof: see Appendix A.
Similar to (4), a strongly concave regularizer −γ/2‖w − 1/K‖22 can be added into the inner
maximization problem of (11), which can boost the stability of the learning procedure and strike a
balance between the max and the average attack performance. However, solving problem (11) and its
regularized version is more complicated than (4) since the inner maximization involves both domain
weights w and adversarial perturbations {δi}, and the outer minimization is used to train possibly
high-dimensional model parameters θ.
We finally remark that there was an independent work [11] which also proposed the formulation (10)
for AT under multiple perturbations. However, what we propose here is the regularized formulation
of (11). As will be evident later, the domain weights w in our formulation have strong interpretability,
which learns the importance level of different attacks. Most significantly, our work has different
motivation from [11], and our idea applies to not only AT but also attack generation in Sec. 2.2.
3 Proposed Algorithm and Theory
In this section, we delve into technical details on how to efficiently solve problems of robust
adversarial attacks given by the generic form (4) and problem (11) for generalized AT under mixed
types of adversarial attacks.
3.1 Alternating one-step PGD for robust adversarial attack generation
Algorithm 1 APGD to solve problem (4)
1: Input: given w(0) and δ(0).
2: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
3: outer min.: fixing w = w(t−1), call PGD
(13) to update δ(t)
4: inner max.: fixing δ = δ(t), update w(t)
via (14)
5: end for
We propose the alternating one-step projected
gradient descent (APGD) method (Algorithm 1)
to solve problem (4). For clarity, we repeat prob-
lem (4) under the adversarial perturbation δ and
its constraint set X defined in Sec. 2.2,
minimize
δ∈X
maximize
w∈P
∑K
i=1 wiFi(δ).
(12)
We show that at each iteration, APGD takes only
one-step PGD for outer minimization and one-step projected gradient ascent for inner maximization
(namely, PGD for its negative objective function). We also show that each alternating step has a
closed-form expression, and the main computational complexity stems from computing the gradient
of the attack loss w.r.t. the input. Therefore, APGD is computationally efficient like PGD, which is
commonly used for design of conventional single `p-norm based adversarial attacks [4].
Outer minimization Considering w = w(t−1) and F (δ) :=
∑K
i=1 w
(t−1)
i Fi(δ) in (4), we per-
form one-step PGD to update δ at iteration t,
δ(t) = projX
(
δ(t−1) − α∇δF (δ(t−1))
)
, (13)
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where proj(·) denotes the Euclidean projection operator, i.e., projX (a) = arg minx∈X ‖x− a‖22 at
the point a, α > 0 is a given learning rate, and∇δ denotes the first order gradient w.r.t. δ.
In (13), the projection operation becomes the key to obtain the closed-form of the updating rule (13).
Recall from Sec. 2.2 that X = {δ|‖δ‖p ≤ , cˇ ≤ δ ≤ cˆ}, where p ∈ {0, 1, 2,∞}, and cˇ = −x0
and cˆ = 1 − x0 (implying cˇ ≤ 0 ≤ cˆ). If p = ∞, then the projection function becomes the clip
function. However, when p ∈ {0, 1, 2}, the closed-form of projection operation becomes non-trivial.
In Proposition 1, we derive the solution of projX (a) under different `p norms.
Proposition 1. Given a point a ∈ Rd and a constraint set X = {δ|‖δ‖p ≤ , cˇ ≤ δ ≤ cˆ}, the
Euclidean projection δ∗ = projX (a) has a closed-form solution when p ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
Proof: See Appendix B. 
Inner maximization By fixing δ = δ(t) and letting ψ(w) :=
∑K
i=1 wiFi(δ
(t))− γ2 ‖w − 1/K‖22
in problem (4), we then perform one-step PGD (w.r.t. −ψ) to update w,
w(t) = projP
(
w(t−1) + β∇wψ(w(t−1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
)
= (b− µ1)+ , (14)
where β > 0 is a given learning rate, ∇wψ(w) = φ(t) − γ(w − 1/K), and φ(t) :=
[F1(δ
(t)), . . . , FK(δ
(t))]K . In (14), the second equality holds due to the closed-form of projection
operation onto the probabilistic simplex P [43], where (·)+ denotes the elementwise non-negative
operator, i.e., (x)+ = max{0, x}, and µ is the root of the equation 1T (b − µ1)+ = 1. Since
1T (b −mini{bi}1 + 1/K)+ ≥ 1T1/K = 1, and 1T (b −maxi{bi}1 + 1/K)+ ≤ 1T1/K = 1,
the root µ exists within the interval [mini{bi} − 1/K,maxi{bi} − 1/K] and can be found via the
bisection method [41].
Convergence analysis We remark that APGD follows the gradient primal-dual optimization frame-
work [40], and thus enjoys the same optimization guarantees. In Theorem 1, we demonstrate the
convergence rate of Algorithm 1 for solving problem (4).
Theorem 1. (inherited from primal-dual min-max optimization) Suppose that in problem (4) Fi(δ)
has L-Lipschitz continuous gradients, and X is a convex compact set. Given learning rates α ≤ 1L
and β < 1γ , then the sequence {δ(t),w(t)}Tt=1 generated by Algorithm 1 converges to a first-order
stationary point2 of problem (4) under the convergence rate O( 1T ).
Proof: Note that the objective function of problem (4) is strongly concave w.r.t. w with parameter γ,
and has γ-Lipschitz continuous gradients. Moreover, we have ‖w‖2 ≤ 1 due to w ∈ P . Using these
facts and [40, Theorem 1] or [44, Theorem 1] completes the proof. 
3.2 Alternating multi-step PGD for generalized AT
We next propose the alternating multi-step projected gradient descent (AMPGD) method to solve the
regularized version of problem (11), which is repeated as follows
minimize
θ
E(x,y)∈D maximize
w∈P,{δi∈Xi}
ψ(θ,w, {δi}) :=
K∑
i=1
wif(θ, δi;x, y)− γ
2
‖w − 1/K‖22. (15)
Algorithm 2 AMPGD to solve problem (15)
1: Input: given θ(0), w(0), δ(0) and K > 0.
2: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
3: given w(t−1) and δ(t−1), perform SGD to
update θ(t) [4]
4: given θ(t), perform R-step PGD to update
w(t) and δ(t)
5: end for
Problem (15) is in a more general non-convex
non-concave min-max setting, where the inner
maximization involves both domain weights
w and adversarial perturbations {δi}. It was
shown in [45] that the multi-step PGD is re-
quired for inner maximization in order to ap-
proximate the near-optimal solution. This is also
in the similar spirit of AT [4], which executed
multi-step PGD attack during inner maximiza-
tion. We summarize AMPGD in Algorithm 2.
At step 4 of Algorithm 2, each PGD step to up-
2The stationarity is measured by the `2 norm of gradient of the objective in (4) w.r.t. (δ,w).
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date w and δ can be decomposed as
w
(t)
r = projP
(
w
(t)
r−1 + β∇wψ(θ(t),w(t)r−1, {δ(t)i,r−1})
)
,∀r ∈ [R],
δ
(t)
i,r = projXi
(
δ
(t)
i,r−1 + β∇δψ(θ(t),w(t)r−1, {δ(t)i,r−1})
)
,∀r ∈ [R],∀i ∈ [K]
where let w(t)1 := w
(t−1) and δ(t)i,1 := δ
(t−1)
i . Here the subscript t represents the iteration index of
AMPGD, and the subscript r denotes the iteration index of R-step PGD. Clearly, the above projection
operations can be derived for closed-form expressions through (14) and Lemma 1. To the best of our
knowledge, it is still an open question to build theoretical convergence guarantees for solving the
general non-convex non-concave min-max problem like (15), except the work [45] which proposed
O(1/T ) convergence rate if the objective function satisfies Polyak- Łojasiewicz conditions [46].
4 Experiments
In this section, we begin by evaluating the proposed min-max optimization strategy on three attack
tasks. We show that our approach leads to substantial improvement compared with state-of-the-art
attack methods such as ensemble PGD [7] and expectation over transformation (EOT) [5, 10, 42].
Moreover, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the generalized AT for multiple types of adversarial
perturbations. We show that the use of trainable domain weights in problem (15) can automatically
adjust the risk level of different attacks during the training process even if the defender lacks prior
knowledge on the strength of these attacks.
4.1 Experimental setup
We thoroughly evaluate our APGD/AMPGD algorithm on MNIST and CIFAR-10. A set of diverse
image classifiers (Model A to H) are trained, including multi-layer perceptrons (MLP), All-CNNs [47],
LeNet [48], LeNetV2, VGG16 [49], ResNet50 [50], Wide-ResNet [4, 51] and GoogLeNet [52]. More
details about model architectures and training process are provided in Appendix C.
4.2 Robust adversarial attacks
Most current works play a min-max game from a defender’s perspective, i.e., adversarial training.
However, we show the great strength of min-max optimization also lies at the side of attack generation.
Note that problem formulations (5)-(7) are applicable to both untargeted and targeted attack. Here
we focus on the former setting and use C&W loss function [3, 4] with a confidence parameter κ = 50.
Ensemble attack over multiple models We craft adversarial examples against an ensemble of
known classifiers. The work [7, 5th place at CAAD-18] proposed an ensemble PGD attack, which
assumed equal importance among different models, namely, wi = 1/K in problem (1). Throughout
this task, we measure the attack performance via ASRall - the attack success rate (ASR) of fooling
model ensembles simultaneously. Compared to the ensemble PGD attack [7], our approach results in
40.79% and 17.48% ASRall improvement averaged over different `p-norm constraints on MNIST and
CIFAR-10, respectively. In what follows, we provide more detailed experiment results and analysis.
Table 1: Comparison of average and min-max (APGD) ensemble attack over four models on MNIST. Acc (%)
represents the test accuracy of classifiers on adversarial examples. Here we set the iterations of APGD as 50 for
attack generation. The learning rates α, β and regularization factor γ are set as - `0 : α = 2, β = 40, γ = 3,
`1 : α = 30, β = 30, γ = 10, `2 : α = 30, β = 40, γ = 3; `∞ : α = 7, β = 40, γ = 3.
Box constraint Opt. AccA AccB AccC AccD ASRall Lift (↑)
`0 ( = 30)
avg. 7.03 1.51 11.27 2.48 84.03 -
min max 3.65 2.36 4.99 3.11 91.97 9.45%
`1 ( = 20)
avg. 20.79 0.15 21.48 6.70 69.31 -
min max 6.12 2.53 8.43 5.11 89.16 28.64%
`2 ( = 3.0)
avg. 6.88 0.03 26.28 14.50 69.12 -
min max 1.51 0.89 3.50 2.06 95.31 37.89%
`∞ ( = 0.2)
avg. 1.05 0.07 41.10 35.03 48.17 -
min max 2.47 0.37 7.39 5.81 90.16 87.17%
In Table 1, we show that our min-max APGD significantly outperforms ensemble PGD in ASRall.
Taking `∞-attack as an example, our min-max attack leads to a 90.16% ASRall, which largely
6
0 10 20 30
Number of iterations
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
At
ta
ck
 su
cc
es
s r
at
e
(a) average case
0 10 20 30
Number of iterations
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
At
ta
ck
 su
cc
es
s r
at
e
A: MLP
B: All-CNNs
C: LeNet
D: LeNetV2
Success (all)
(b) minmax
1 3 5 7
Number of iterations
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
w
i
A
B
C
D
(c) weight {wi}
Figure 1: Ensemble attack against four DNN models on MNIST. (a) & (b): Attack success rate of adversarial
examples generated by average (ensemble PGD) or min-max (APGD) attack method. (c): Boxplot of weight w
in APGD adversarial loss for four models. Here we adopt the same `∞-attack as Table 1.
outperforms 48.17% (ensemble PGD). The reason is that Model C, D are more difficult to attack,
which can be observed from their higher test accuracy on adversarial examples. As a result, although
the adversarial examples crafted by assigning equal weights over multiple models are able to attack {A,
B} well, they achieve a much lower ASR (i.e., 1 - Acc) in {C, D}. By contrast, APGD automatically
handles the worst case {C, D} by slightly sacrificing the performance on {A, B}: 31.47% averaged
ASR improvement on {C, D} versus 0.86% degradation on {A, B}. More results on CIFAR-10 and
advanced DNNs (e.g., GoogLeNet) are provided in Appendix D.1.
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Figure 2: Attack success rate (ASRall) of average and min-max `∞
ensemble attack versus maximum perturbation magnitude .
Figure 1 depicts the ASR of four
models under average/min-max at-
tacks as well as the distribution of
domain weights during attack gen-
eration. For ensemble PGD (Fig-
ure 1a), Model C and D are attacked
insufficiently, leading to relatively
low ASR and thus weak ensemble
performance. By contrast, APGD
(Figure 1b) will encode the diffi-
culty level to attack different models
based on the current adversarial loss.
It dynamically adjusts the weightwi
as shown in Figure 1c. For instance,
the weight for Model D is first raised to 0.45 because D is difficult to attack initially. Then it decreases
to 0.3 once Model D encounters the sufficient attack power and the corresponding attack performance
is no longer improved. It is worth noticing that APGD is highly efficient because wi converges after
a small number of iterations. To perform a boarder evaluation, we repeat the above experiments (`∞
norm) under different  in Figure 2. The ASR of min-max strategy is consistently better or on part
with the average strategy. Moreover, APGD achieves more significant improvement when moderate 
is chosen: MNIST ( ∈ [0.15, 0.25]) and CIFAR-10 ( ∈ [0.03, 0.05]).
Also, tracking domain weights w provides us novel insights for model robustness and understanding
attack procedure. From our theory, a model with higher robustness always corresponds to a larger
w because its loss is hard to attack and becomes the “worst” term. This hypothesis can be verified
empirically. According to Figure 1c, we have wc > wd > wa > wb – indicating a decrease in model
robustness for C, D, A and B, which is exactly verified by AccC > AccD > AccA > AccB in Table 1.
Universal perturbation over multiple examples Similarly, we evaluate APGD in universal per-
turbation on MNIST and CIFAR-10, where 10,000 test images are randomly divided into equal-size
groups (containing K images per group) for universal perturbation. We measure two types of ASR
(%), ASRavg and ASRgp. Here the former represents the ASR over all images in all groups, and
the latter signifies the ASR over all groups but images within each group must be successfully
attacked simultaneously by universal perturbation. When K = 5, our approach achieves 42.63% and
35.21% averaged ASRall improvement over given models on MNIST and CIFAR-10 compared to
the averaging strategy.
Table 2 compares the average with the min-max strategy on universal perturbation. As we can see,
our method (APGD) always achieves higher ASRgp for different values of K. Similar to min-max
ensemble attack, APGD can successfully attack images that the average-based PGD method fails
to attack by adjusting domain weights, and thus leading to a higher ASRgp. Besides, the min-
max universal perturbation also offers interpretability of “image robustness” by associating domain
7
Table 2: Comparison of average and minmax optimization on universal perturbation over multiple input
examples. The adversarial examples are generated by `∞-APGD with α = 6, β = 50 and γ = 4.
Setting K = 2 K = 4 K = 5 K = 10
Dataset Model Opt. ASRavg ASRgp Lift (↑) ASRavg ASRgp Lift (↑) ASRavg ASRgp Lift (↑) ASRavg ASRgp Lift (↑)
MNIST
MLP avg. 97.19 94.48 - 85.13 56.64 - 79.11 38.05 - 60.53 3.50 -
min max 98.15 96.96 2.62% 83.76 72.32 27.68% 72.28 53.70 41.13% 30.10 6.70 91.43%
All-CNNs avg. 97.76 95.52 - 85.19 51.92 - 80.02 31.25 - 65.79 2.10 -
min max 99.69 99.38 4.04% 90.11 75.64 45.69% 80.21 53.50 71.20% 43.54 4.30 104.8%
LeNet avg. 94.78 89.96 - 62.12 28.72 - 51.84 19.15 - 30.29 4.30 -
min max 96.60 94.58 5.14% 55.50 36.72 27.86% 42.79 25.80 34.73% 22.48 7.20 67.44%
LeNetV2 avg. 94.72 90.04 - 61.59 26.60 - 50.42 17.05 - 26.49 4.80 -
min max 97.33 95.68 6.26% 55.38 35.52 33.53% 40.22 21.05 23.46% 19.73 7.10 47.92%
CIFAR-10
All-CNNs avg. 91.09 83.08 - 85.66 54.72 - 82.76 40.20 - 71.22 4.50 -
min max 92.22 85.98 3.49% 87.63 65.80 20.25% 85.02 55.74 38.66% 65.64 11.80 162.2%
LeNetV2 avg. 93.26 86.90 - 90.04 66.12 - 88.28 55.00 - 72.02 8.90 -
min max 93.34 87.08 0.21% 91.91 71.64 8.35% 91.21 63.55 15.55% 82.85 25.10 182.0%
VGG16 avg. 90.76 82.56 - 89.36 63.92 - 88.74 55.20 - 85.86 22.40 -
min max 92.40 85.92 4.07% 90.04 70.40 10.14% 88.97 63.30 14.67% 79.07 30.80 37.50%
GoogLeNet avg. 85.02 72.48 - 75.20 32.68 - 71.82 19.60 - 59.01 0.40 -
min max 87.08 77.82 7.37% 77.05 46.20 41.37% 71.20 33.70 71.94% 45.46 2.40 600.0%
Table 3: Comparison of average and min-max optimization on robust attack over multiple data transformations
on CIFAR-10. Acc (%) represents the test accuracy of classifiers on adversarial examples (`∞-APGD ( = 0.03)
with α = 2, β = 100 and γ = 10) under different transformations.
Model Opt. Accori Accflh Accflv Accbri Accgam Acccrop ASRavg ASRgp Lift (↑)
A avg. 10.80 21.93 14.75 11.52 10.66 20.03 85.05 55.88 -
min max 12.14 18.05 13.61 13.52 11.99 16.78 85.65 60.03 7.43%
B avg. 5.49 11.56 9.51 5.43 5.75 15.89 91.06 72.21 -
min max 6.22 8.61 9.74 6.35 6.42 11.99 91.78 77.43 7.23%
C avg. 7.66 21.88 15.50 8.15 7.87 15.36 87.26 56.51 -
min max 8.51 14.75 13.88 9.16 8.58 13.35 88.63 63.58 12.51%
D avg. 8.00 20.47 13.46 7.73 8.52 15.90 87.65 61.13 -
min max 9.19 13.18 12.72 8.79 9.18 13.11 88.97 67.49 10.40%
weights with image visualization; see Appendix D.3 for an example in which the large domain weight
corresponds to the MNIST letter with clear appearance (e.g., bold letter).
Robust adversarial attack over data transformations EOT [42] achieves state-of-the-art perfor-
mance in producing adversarial examples robust to data transformations. From (7), we could derive
EOT as a special case when the weights satisfy wi = 1/K (average case). For each input sample
(ori), we transform the image under a series of functions, e.g., flipping horizontally (flh) or vertically
(flv), adjusting brightness (bri), performing gamma correction (gam) and cropping (crop), and group
each image with its transformed variants. Similar to universal perturbation, ASRavg and ASRgp are
reported to measure the ASR over all transformed images and groups of transformed images (each
group is successfully attacked signifies successfully attacking an example under all transformers). As
shown in Table 3, compared to EOT, our approach leads to 9.39% averaged lift in ASRgp over given
models on CIFAR-10 by optimizing the weights for various transformations. Due to limited space,
we leave the details of transformers in Append C.3 and the results under randomness (e.g., flipping
images randomly w.p. 0.8; randomly clipping the images at specific range) in Appendix D.1.
4.3 Adversarial training for multiple adversarial perturbations
Compared to vanilla AT, we show the generalized AT scheme produces models robust to multiple types
of perturbation, thus leads to stronger “overall robustness”. We measure the training performance
using two types of Acc (%): Accmaxadv and Acc
avg
adv , where Acc
max
adv denotes the test accuracy over
examples with the strongest perturbation (`∞ or `2), and Acc
avg
adv denotes the averaged test accuracy
over examples with all types of perturbations (`∞ and `2). Moreover, we define the area under curve
“Accmaxadv vs. ” (see Figure 3b) as a measure of the overall worst-case robustness (denoting as S).
Table 4 shows the test accuracy of MLP in different training schemes: a) natural training; b) single-
norm: vanilla AT (`∞ or `2); c) multi-norm: generalized AT (avg and min max). If the adversary
only performs single-type attack, training and testing on the same attack type leads to the best
performance (diagonal of `∞-`2 block). However, for the union of `∞ and `2 attacks, our AMPGD
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Figure 3: (a): Violin plot of weight w in APGD versus perturbation magnitude  of `2-attack in AT; (b) & (c):
Robustness of MLP under different AT schemes.
achieves better Accmaxadv and Acc
avg
adv. Furthermore, our min-max scheme leads to faster convergence
compared to the averaging scheme (Figure A3a).
Table 4: Adversarial training of MNIST models on single attacks (`∞ and
`2) and multiple attacks (avg. and minmax). The perturbation magnitude 
for `∞ and `2 attacks are 0.2 and 2.0, respectively. Top 2 test accuracy on
each metric are highlighted. Complete table for LeNet and varied  is given in
Table A7 (Appendix D.2).
Model Opt. Acc. Acc-`∞ Acc-`2 Accmaxadv Acc
avg
adv
MLP
natural 98.30 2.70 13.86 0.85 8.28
`∞ 98.08 77.70 69.17 66.34 73.43
`2 98.72 70.03 81.74 69.14 75.88
avg. 98.62 75.09 79.00 72.23 77.05
min max 98.59 75.96 79.15 73.43 77.55
For a broader evaluation,
during the training proce-
dure we fix `∞ as 0.2, and
change `2 from 0.2 to 5.6
(`∞×
√
d, see [12]), where
the `∞ and `2 balls are not
completely overlapped. In
Figure 3a, as `2 increases,
`2-attack becomes stronger
so the corresponding w also
increases, which is consis-
tent with min-max spirit –
defending the strongest at-
tack. Note that min max or
avg training does not always lead to the best performance on Accmaxadv and Acc
avg
adv, especially when
the strengths of two attacks diverge greatly (see Table A7). This can be explained by the large
overlapping between `∞ and `2 balls (see Figure A2). However, Figure 3b and 3c show that AMPGD
is able to achieve a rather robust model no matter how  changes (red lines), which empirically verifies
the effectiveness of our proposed training scheme. In terms of the area-under-the-curve measure
S, AMPGD achieves the highest worst-case robustness: 6.27% and 17.64% accuracy improvement
compared to the vanilla AT with `∞ and `2 attacks, respectively.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a general min-max framework applicable to both adversarial attack and
defense settings. We show that many problem setups can be re-formulated under this general
framework. Extensive experiments show that proposed algorithms lead to significant improvement on
multiple attack and defense tasks compared with previous state-of-the-art approaches. In particular,
we obtain 40.79%, 35.21% and 9.39% improvement on attacking model ensembles, devising universal
perturbation to input samples, and data transformations under CIFAR-10, respectively. Our min-
max scheme also generalizes adversarial training (AT) for multiple types of adversarial attacks,
attaining faster convergence and better robustness compared to the vanilla AT and the average strategy.
Moreover, our approach provides a holistic tool for self-risk assessment by learning domain weights.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1. Problem (10) is equivalent to
minimize
θ
E(x,y)∈D maximize
w∈P,{δi∈Xi}
K∑
i=1
wif(θ, δi;x, y),
where w ∈ RK represent domain weights, and P has been defined in (1).
Proof of Lemma 1:
Similar to (1), problem (10) is equivalent to
minimize
θ
E(x,y)∈D maximize
w∈P
K∑
i=1
wiFi(θ). (16)
Recall that Fi(θ) := maximizeδi∈Xi ftr(θ, δi;x, y), problem can then be written as
minimize
θ
E(x,y)∈D maximize
w∈P
K∑
i=1
[wi maximize
δi∈Xi
ftr(θ, δi;x, y)]. (17)
According to proof by contradiction, it is clear that problem (17) is equivalent to
minimize
θ
E(x,y)∈D maximize
w∈P,{δi∈Xi}
K∑
i=1
wiftr(θ, δi;x, y). (18)

B Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1. Given a point a ∈ Rd and a constraint set X = {δ|‖δ‖p ≤ , cˇ ≤ δ ≤ cˆ}, the
Euclidean projection δ∗ = projX (a) has the closed-form solution when p ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
1) If p = 1, then δ∗ is given by
δ∗i =
{
P[cˇi,cˆi](ai)
∑d
i=1 |P[cˇi,cˆi](ai)| ≤ 
P[cˇi,cˆi](sign(ai) max {|ai| − λ1, 0}) otherwise,
(19)
where xi denotes the ith element of a vector x; P[cˇi,cˆi](·) denotes the clip function over the in-
terval [cˇi, cˆi]; sign(x) = 1 if x ≥ 0, otherwise 0; λ1 ∈ (0,maxi |ai| − /d] is the root of∑d
i=1 |P[cˇi,cˆi](sign(ai) max {|ai| − λ1, 0})| = .
2) If p = 2, then δ∗ is given by
δ∗i =
{
P[cˇi,cˆi](ai)
∑d
i=1(P[cˇi,cˆi](ai))
2 ≤ 2
P[cˇi,cˆi] (ai/(λ2 + 1)) otherwise,
(20)
where λ2 ∈ (0, ‖a‖2/− 1] is the root of
∑d
i=1(P[cˇi,cˆi](ai/(λ2 + 1)))
2 = 2.
3) If p = 0 and  ∈ N+, then δ∗ is given by
δ∗i =
{
δ′i ηi ≥ [η]
0 otherwise, ηi =

√
2aicˇi − cˇ2i ai < cˇi√
2aicˆi − cˆ2i ai > cˆi|ai| otherwise.
(21)
where [η] denotes the -th largest element of η, and δ′i = P[cˇi,cˆi](ai).
Proof of Proposition 1:
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`1 norm When we find the Euclidean projection of a onto the set X , we solve
minimize
δ
1
2‖δ − a‖22 + I[cˇ,cˆ](δ)
subject to ‖δ‖1 ≤ ,
(22)
where I[cˇ,cˆ](·) is the indicator function of the set [cˇ, cˆ]. The Langragian of this problem is
L =
1
2
‖δ − a‖22 + I[cˇ,cˆ](δ) + λ1(‖δ‖1 − ) (23)
=
d∑
i=1
(
1
2
(δi − ai)2 + λ1|δi|+ I[cˇi,cˆi](δi))− λ1. (24)
The minimizer δ∗ minimizes the Lagrangian, it is obtained by elementwise soft-thresholding
δ∗i = P[cˇi,cˆi](sign(ai) max {|ai| − λ1, 0}).
where xi is the ith element of a vector x, P[cˇi,cˆi](·) is the clip function over the interval [cˇi, cˆi].
The primal, dual feasibility and complementary slackness are
λ1 = 0, ‖δ‖1 =
d∑
i=1
|δi| =
d∑
i=1
|P[cˇi,cˆi](ai)| ≤  (25)
or λ1 > 0, ‖δ‖1 =
d∑
i=1
|δi| =
d∑
i=1
|P[cˇi,cˆi](sign(ai) max {|ai| − λ1, 0})| = . (26)
If
∑d
i=1 |P[cˇi,cˆi](ai)| ≤ , δ∗i = P[cˇi,cˆi](ai). Otherwise δ∗i = P[cˇi,cˆi](sign(ai) max {|ai| − λ1, 0}),
where λ1 is given by the root of the equation
∑d
i=1 |P[cˇi,cˆi](sign(ai) max {|ai| − λ1, 0})| = .
Bisection method can be used to solve the above equation for λ1, starting with the initial interval
(0,maxi |ai| − /d]. Since
∑d
i=1 |P[cˇi,cˆi](sign(ai) max {|ai| − 0, 0})| =
∑d
i=1 |P[cˇi,cˆi](ai)| >
 in this case, and
∑d
i=1 |P[cˇi,cˆi](sign(ai) max {|ai| −maxi |ai|+ /d, 0})| ≤∑d
i=1 |P[cˇi,cˆi](sign(ai)(/d))| ≤
∑d
i=1(/d) = .
`2 norm When we find the Euclidean projection of a onto the set X , we solve
minimize
δ
‖δ − a‖22 + I[cˇ,cˆ](δ)
subject to ‖δ‖22 ≤ 2,
(27)
where I[cˇ,cˆ](·) is the indicator function of the set [cˇ, cˆ]. The Langragian of this problem is
L = ‖δ − a‖22 + I[cˇ,cˆ](δ) + λ2(‖δ‖22 − 2) (28)
=
d∑
i=1
((δi − ai)2 + λ2δ2i + I[cˇi,cˆi](δi))− λ22. (29)
The minimizer δ∗ minimizes the Lagrangian, it is
δ∗i = P[cˇi,cˆi](
1
λ2 + 1
ai).
The primal, dual feasibility and complementary slackness are
λ2 = 0, ‖δ‖22 =
d∑
i=1
δ2i =
d∑
i=1
(P[cˇi,cˆi](ai))
2 ≤ 2 (30)
or λ2 > 0, ‖δ‖22 =
d∑
i=1
δ2i = (P[cˇi,cˆi](
1
λ2 + 1
ai))
2 = 2. (31)
If
∑d
i=1(P[cˇi,cˆi](ai))
2 ≤ 2, δ∗i = P[cˇi,cˆi](ai). Otherwise δ∗i = P[cˇi,cˆi]
(
1
λ2+1
ai
)
, where λ2 is
given by the root of the equation
∑d
i=1(P[cˇi,cˆi](
1
λ2+1
ai))
2 = 2. Bisection method can be used to
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solve the above equation for λ2, starting with the initial interval (0,
√∑d
i=1(ai)
2/ − 1]. Since∑d
i=1(P[cˇi,cˆi](
1
0+1ai))
2 =
∑d
i=1(P[cˇi,cˆi](ai))
2 > 2 in this case, and
∑d
i=1(P[cˇi,cˆi](
1
λ2+1
ai))
2 =∑d
i=1(P[cˇi,cˆi](ai/
√∑d
i=1(ai)
2))2 ≤ 2∑di=1(ai)2/(√∑di=1(ai)2)2 = 2.
`0 norm For `0 norm in X , it is independent to the box constraint. So we can clip a to the box
constraint first, which is δ′i = P[cˇi,cˆi](ai), and then project it onto `0 norm.
We find the additional Euclidean distance of every element in a and zero after they are clipped to the
box constraint, which is
ηi =

√
a2i − (ai − cˇi)2 ai < cˇi√
a2i − (ai − cˆi)2 ai > cˆi
|ai| otherwise.
(32)
It can be equivalently written as
ηi =

√
2aicˇi − cˇ2i ai < cˇi√
2aicˆi − cˆ2i ai > cˆi|ai| otherwise.
(33)
To derive the Euclidean projection onto `0 norm, we find the -th largest element in η and call it [η].
We keep the elements whose corresponding ηi is above or equals to -th, and set rest to zeros. The
closed-form solution is given by
δ∗i =
{
δ′i ηi ≥ [η]
0 otherwise. (34)

C Experiment Setup
For reproducibility, the anonymous code repository is publicly accessible3 with detailed instructions
and scripts about how to exactly reproduce the results reported in the paper.
C.1 Model Architectures and Training Details
For a comprehensive evaluation of proposed algorithms, we adopt a set of diverse DNN models
(Model A to H), including multi-layer perceptrons (MLP), All-CNNs [47], LeNet [48], LeNetV24,
VGG16 [49], ResNet50 [50], Wide-ResNet [4] and GoogLeNet [52]. For the last four models, we
use the exact same architecture as original papers and evaluate them only on CIFAR-10 dataset. The
details for model architectures are provided in Table A2. For compatibility with our framework,
we implement and train these models based on the strategies adopted in pytorch-cifar5 and achieve
comparable performance on clean images (see Table A1). To foster reproducibility, all the trained
models are publicly accessible in the anonymous link6. Specifically, we trained MNIST classifiers for
50 epochs with Adam and a constant learning rate of 0.001. For CIFAR-10 classifers, the models are
trained for 250 epochs with SGD (using 0.8 nesterov momentum, weight decay 5e−4). The learning
rate is reduced at epoch 100 and 175 with a decay rate of 0.1. The initial learning rate is set as 0.01
for models {A, B, C, D, H} and 0.1 for {E, F, G}. Note that no data augmentation is employed in the
training.
C.2 Crafting adversarial examples
We adopt variant C&W loss in APGD/PGD as suggested in [4, 3]. Cross-entropy loss is also
supported in our implementation. The adversarial examples are generated by 20-step PGD/APGD
unless otherwise stated (e.g., 50 steps for ensemble attacks). Due to varying model robustness
3https://tinyurl.com/y5ec5ptf
4An enhanced version of original LeNet with more layers and units (see Table A2 Model D).
5https://github.com/kuangliu/pytorch-cifar
6https://tinyurl.com/y5e8z5f8
15
Table A1: Clean test accuracy of DNN models on MNIST and CIFAR-10. We roughly derive the model
robustness by attacking models separately using FGSM [23]. The adversarial examples are generated by FGSM
`∞-attack ( = 0.2).
MNIST CIFAR-10
Model Acc. FGSM Model Acc. FGSM Model Acc. FGSM
A: MLP 98.20% 18.92% A: MLP 55.36% 11.25% E: VGG16 87.57% 10.83%
B: All-CNNs 99.49% 50.95% B: All-CNNs 84.18% 9.89% F: ResNet50 88.11% 10.73%
C: LeNet 99.25% 63.23% C: LeNet 64.95% 14.45% G: Wide-ResNet 91.67% 15.78%
D: LeNetV2 99.33% 56.36% D: LeNetV2 74.89% 9.77% H: GoogLeNet 90.92% 9.91%
Table A2: Neural network architectures used on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 dataset. Conv: convolutional layer,
FC: fully connected layer, Globalpool: global average pooling layer.
A (MLP) B (All-CNNs [47]) C (LeNet [48]) D (LeNetV2)
FC(128) + Relu Conv([32, 64], 3, 3) + Relu Conv(6, 5, 5) + Relu Conv(32, 3, 3) + Relu
FC(128) + Relu Conv(128, 3, 3) + Dropout(0.5) Maxpool(2, 2) Maxpool(2, 2)
FC(64) + Relu Conv([128, 128], 3, 3) + Relu Conv(16, 5, 5) + Relu Conv(64, 3, 3) + Relu
FC(10) Conv(128, 3, 3) + Dropout(0.5) Maxpool(2, 2) Maxpool(2, 2)
Softmax Conv(128, 3, 3) + Relu FC(120) + Relu FC(128) + Relu
Conv(128, 1, 1) + Relu FC(84) + Relu Dropout(0.25)
Conv(10, 1, 1) + Globalpool FC(10) FC(10)
Softmax Softmax Softmax
E (VGG16 [49]) F (ResNet50 [50]) G (Wide-ResNet [4]) H (GoogLeNet [52])
on different datasets, the perturbation magnitudes  are set separately. For universal perturbation
experiments, the  are set as 0.2 (A, B), 0.3 (C) and 0.25 (D) on MNIST; 0.02 (B, H), 0.35 (E) and
0.05 (D) on CIFAR-10. For generalized AT, the models on MNIST are trained following the same
rules in last section, except that training epochs are prolonged to 350 and adversarial examples are
crafted for assisting the training with a ratio of 0.5. Our experiment setup is based on CleverHans
package7 and Carlini and Wagner’s framework8.
C.3 Details of conducted data transformations
To demonstrate the effectiveness of APGD in generating robust adversarial examples against multiple
transformations, we adopt a series of common transformations, including a&b) flipping images
horizontally (flh) and vertically (flv); c) adjusting image brightness (bri); d) performing gamma
correction (gam), e) cropping and re-sizing images (crop); f) rotating images (rot).
Moreover, both deterministic and stochastic transformations are considered in our experiments. In
particular, Table 3 and Table A6 are deterministic settings - rot: rotating images 30 degree clockwise;
crop: cropping images in the center (0.8 × 0.8) and resizing them to 32 × 32; bri: adjusting the
brightness of images with a scale of 0.1; gam: performing gamma correction with a value of 1.3.
Differently, in Table A5, we introduce randomness for drawing samples from the distribution - rot:
rotating images randomly from -10 to 10 degree; crop: cropping images in the center randomly
(from 0.6 to 1.0); other transformations are done with a probability of 0.8. In experiments, we adopt
tf.image API 9 for processing the images.
D Supplementary Results
D.1 Robust adversarial attacks
Ensemble attack over multiple models Table A3 and A4 show the performance of average
(ensemble PGD [7]) and min-max (APGD) strategies for attacking model ensembles. Our min-max
approach results in 19.27% and 15.69% averaged improvement on ASRall over model sets {A, B, C,
D} and {A, E, F, H} on CIFAR-10.
7https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans
8https://github.com/carlini/nn_robust_attacks
9https://www.tensorflow.org/api_docs/python/tf/image
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Table A3: Comparison of average and min-max (APGD) ensemble attack over four models on CIFAR-10. Acc
(%) represents the test accuracy of classifiers on adversarial examples. The learning rates α, β and regularization
factor γ are set as - `0 : α = 1, β = 150, γ = 1, `1 : α = 4, β = 100, γ = 5, `2 : α = 8, β = 100, γ = 3;
`∞ : α = 5, β = 50, γ = 6. The attack iteration for APGD is set as 50.
Box constraint Opt. AccA AccB AccC AccD ASRall Lift (↑)
`0 ( = 50)
avg. 27.86 3.15 5.16 6.17 65.16 -
min max 18.74 8.66 9.64 9.70 71.44 9.64%
`1 ( = 30)
avg. 32.92 2.07 5.55 6.36 59.74 -
min max 12.46 3.74 5.62 5.86 78.65 31.65%
`2 ( = 2.0)
avg. 24.3 1.51 4.59 4.20 69.55 -
min max 7.17 3.03 4.65 5.14 83.95 20.70%
`∞ ( = 0.05)
avg. 19.69 1.55 5.61 4.26 73.29 -
min max 7.21 2.68 4.74 4.59 84.36 15.10%
Table A4: Comparison of average and min-max (APGD) ensemble attack over four models on CIFAR-10. Acc
(%) represents the test accuracy of classifiers on adversarial examples. The learning rates α, β and regularization
factor γ are set as - `0 : α = 1, β = 150, γ = 1, `1 : α = 4, β = 100, γ = 5, `2 : α = 8, β = 100, γ = 3;
`∞ : α = 5, β = 50, γ = 6. The attack iteration for APGD is set as 50.
Box constraint Opt. AccA AccE AccF AccH ASRall Lift (↑)
`0 ( = 70)
avg. 27.38 6.33 7.18 6.99 66.56 -
min max 19.38 8.72 9.48 8.94 73.83 10.92%
`1 ( = 30)
avg. 30.90 2.06 1.85 1.84 66.23 -
min max 12.56 3.21 2.70 2.72 83.13 25.52%
`2 ( = 1.5)
avg. 20.87 1.75 1.21 1.54 76.41 -
min max 10.26 3.15 2.24 2.37 84.99 11.23%
`∞ ( = 0.03)
avg. 25.75 2.59 1.66 2.27 70.54 -
min max 13.47 3.79 3.15 3.48 81.17 15.07%
Robust adversarial attack over data transformations Table A5 and A6 compare the performance
of average (EOT [42]) and min-max (APGD) strategies. Our approach results in 4.31% and 8.22%
averaged lift over four models {A, B, C, D} on CIFAR-10 under given stochastic and deterministic
transformation sets.
Table A5: Comparison of average and min-max optimization on robust attack over multiple data transformations
on CIFAR-10. Note that all data transformations are conducted stochastically with a probability of 0.8, except
for crop which randomly crops a central area from original image and re-size it into 32× 32. The adversarial
examples are generated by 20-step `∞-APGD ( = 0.03) with α = 2, β = 100 and γ = 10.
Model Opt. Accori Accflh Accflv Accbri Acccrop ASRavg ASRgp Lift (↑)
A avg. 11.55 21.60 13.64 12.30 22.37 83.71 55.97 -
min max 13.06 18.90 13.43 13.90 20.27 84.09 59.17 5.72%
B avg. 6.74 11.55 10.33 6.59 18.21 89.32 69.52 -
min max 8.19 11.13 10.31 8.31 16.29 89.15 71.18 2.39%
C avg. 8.23 17.47 13.93 8.54 18.83 86.60 58.85 -
min max 9.68 13.45 13.41 9.95 18.23 87.06 61.63 4.72%
D avg. 8.67 19.75 11.60 8.46 19.35 86.43 60.96 -
min max 10.43 16.41 12.14 10.15 17.64 86.65 63.64 4.40%
D.2 Adversarial training against multiple types of adversarial attacks
Robustness evaluation Figure A1 presents “overall robustness” comparison of our min-max gen-
eralized AT scheme and vanilla AT with single type of attacks (`∞ and `2) on MNIST (LeNet).
Similarly, our min-max training scheme leads to a higher “overall robustness” measured by S. In
practice, due to the lacking knowledge of the strengths/types of the attacks used by adversaries, it
is meaningful to enhance “overall robustness” of models under the worst perturbation (Accmaxadv ).
Specifically, our min-max generalized AT leads to 6.27% and 17.63% improvement on S compared
to single-type AT with `∞ and `2 attacks. Furthermore, weighting factor w of the probability simplex
helps understand the behavior of AT under mixed types of attacks. Our AMPGD algorithm will
adjust w automatically according to the min-max principle - defending the strongest attack. In
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Table A6: Comparison of average and min-max optimization on robust attack over multiple data transformations
on CIFAR-10. Here a new rotation (rot) transformation is introduced, where images are rotated 30 degrees
clockwise. Note that all data transformations are conducted with a probability of 1.0. The adversarial examples
are generated by 20-step `∞-APGD ( = 0.03) with α = 2, β = 100 and γ = 10.
Model Opt. Accori Accflh Accflv Accbri Accgam Acccrop Accrot ASRavg ASRgp Lift (↑)
A avg. 11.06 22.37 14.81 12.32 10.92 20.40 15.89 84.60 49.24 -
min max 13.51 18.84 14.03 15.20 13.00 18.03 14.79 84.66 52.31 6.23%
B avg. 5.55 11.96 9.97 5.63 5.94 16.42 11.47 90.44 65.18 -
min max 6.75 9.13 10.56 6.72 7.11 12.23 10.80 90.96 70.38 7.98%
C avg. 7.65 22.30 15.82 8.17 8.07 15.44 15.09 86.78 49.67 -
min max 9.05 15.10 14.57 9.57 9.31 14.11 14.23 87.72 55.37 11.48%
D avg. 8.22 20.88 13.49 7.91 8.71 16.33 14.98 87.07 53.52 -
min max 10.17 14.65 13.62 10.03 10.35 14.36 13.82 87.57 57.36 7.17%
Figure A1a, as `2 increases, `2-attack becomes stronger so its corresponding w increases as well.
When `2 ≥ 2.5, `2-attack dominates the adversarial training process. That is to say, our AMPGD
algorithm will put more weights on stronger attacks even if the strengths of attacks are unknown,
which is a meritorious feature in practice.
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Figure A1: (a): Violin plot of weight w in APGD as a function of perturbation magnitude  of `2 attack in
adversarial training; (b) & (c): Robustness of LeNet (Model C) under different adversarial training schemes.
Table A7 shows complete results on the test accuracy of models in different training schemes. In
general, the min-max generalized AT obtains better performance than averaging strategy. AMPGD
always leads to Top-2 Accmaxadv and Acc
avg
adv.
Overlap of `p-norm balls As reported in Sec. 4.3, our min-max generalized AT does not always
result in the best performance on the success rate of defending the worst/strongest perturbation
(Accmaxadv ) for given (`∞ , `2) pair, especially when the strengths of two attacks diverge greatly (e.g.,
 for `∞ and `2 attacks are 0.2 and 0.5). In what follows, we provide explanation and analysis about
this finding inspired by recent work [12].
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
( 2)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
(a) `∞ ∈ `2
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
( 2)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
(b) `2 ∈ `∞
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
1.9
2.0
2.1
2-n
or
m
adv. example ( )
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
( 2)
0.2
0.4
-n
or
m
adv. example ( 2)
(c) average `p-norm
Figure A2: (a) & (b): Comparison of the percentage of adversarial examples inside `∞ ball (left, blue area)
and inside `2 ball (right, red area). In particular, the red (blue) area in (a) (or (b)) represents the percentage of
adversarial examples crafted by `∞(`2) attack that also belong to `2 (`∞) ball. We generate adversarial examples
on 10,000 test images for each attack. (c): Average `p norm of adversarial examples as a function of perturbation
magnitude `2 . The top (bottom) side represents the `2-norm (`∞) of the adversarial examples generated by `∞
(`2) attack as `2 for generalized AT increases. Note that the same  as the AT procedure is used while attacking
trained robust models.
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Figure A2 shows the real overlap of `∞ and `2 norm balls in adversarial attacks for MLP model on
MNIST. Ideally, if `2 satisfies `∞ < `2 < `∞ ×
√
d, `∞ and `2 balls will not cover each other
completely [12]. In other words, AT with `∞ and `2 attacks cannot interchange with each other.
However, the real range of `2 for keeping `2 and `∞ balls intersected is not (`∞ , `∞×
√
d), because
crafted adversarial examples are not uniformly distributed in `p-norm balls. In Figure A2b, 99.98%
adversarial examples devising using `2 attack are also inside `∞ ball, even if 0.2 < `2 = 0.5 < 5.6.
In consequence, AT with `∞ attack is enough to handle `2-attack in overwhelming majority cases,
which results in better performance than min-max optimization (Table A7a).
Figure A2c presents the average `p distance of adversarial examples with `2 increasing. The average
`2-norm (green line) of adversarial examples generated by `∞ attack remains around 2.0 with a slight
rising trend. This is consistent to our setting - fixing `2 as 0.2. It also indicates model robustness
may effect the behavior of attacks - as `2 increases, robustly trained MLP model becomes more
robust against `2 examples, so the `∞ attacker implicitly increases `2 norm to attack the model more
effectively. On the other hand, the average `∞-norm increases substantially as `2 increases from 0.5
to 2.5. When `2 arriving at 0.85, the average `∞ norm gets close to 0.2, so around half adversarial
examples generated by `2-attack are also inside `∞ balls, which is consistent with Table A2b.
Learning curve under different training schemes Figure A3 shows the learning curves of model
A under different AT schemes, where two setting are plotted: (a) (`∞ , `2) = (0.2, 0.5); (b)
(`∞ , `2) = (0.2, 2.0). Apart from better worst-case robustness shown in Table A7, our min-max
generalized AT leads to a faster convergence compared to average-based AT, especially when the
strengths of two attacks diverge greatly. For instance, when `2 = 0.5 (Figure A3a), the robust model
trained with AMPGD reaches 70% test accuracy on the worst perturbation (1-Rmaxadv ) within 210
epochs versus 280 epochs in average setting. When `2 = 2.0 (Figure A3b), the learning curves for
min-max and average strategy are very close because the strengths of two attacks are similar, which
is verified by approximately equal weights in Figure 3a.
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Figure A3: Learning curves of MLP model under different adversarial training schemes on MNIST. Note that
each experiment is repeated ten times with different random seeds.
D.3 Interpretability of domain weight w on universal perturbation to multiple images
Tracking domain weight w of the probability simplex from our algorithms is an exclusive feature of
solving problem 1. In Sec 4, we show the strength ofw in understanding the procedure of optimization
and interpreting the adversarial robustness. Here we would like to show the usage of w in measuring
“image robustness” on devising universal perturbation to multiple input samples. Table A8 and A9
show the image groups on MNIST with weight w in APGD and two metrics (distortion of `2-C&W,
minimum  for `∞-PGD) of measuring the difficulty of attacking single images. The binary search is
utilized to searching for the minimum perturbation.
Although adversaries need to consider a trade-off between multiple images while devising universal
perturbation, we find that weighting factor w in APGD is highly correlated under different `p norms.
Furthermore, w is also highly related to minimum distortion required for attacking a single image
successfully. It means the inherent “image robustness” exists and effects the behavior of generating
universal perturbation. Larger weight w usually indicates an image with higher robustness (e.g.,
fifth ’zero’ in the first row of Table A8), which usually corresponds to the MNIST letter with clear
appearance (e.g., bold letter).
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Table A7: Adversarial training of MNIST models with single attacks (`∞ and `2) and multiple attacks (avg.
and minmax). During the training process, the perturbation magnitude `∞ is fixed as 0.2, and `2 are changed
from 0.5 to 3.0 with a step size of 0.5. For min-max scheme, the adversarial examples are crafted using 20-step
`∞-APGD with α = 6, β = 50 and γ = 4. The ratio of adversarial and benign examples in adversarial training
is set as 1.0.
(a) (`∞ , `2) = (0.2, 0.5)
Model Opt. Acc. Acc-`∞ Acc-`2 Accmaxadv Acc
avg
adv
MLP
natural 98.28 2.78 93.75 1.80 48.27
`∞ 98.22 77.82 97.11 77.23 87.46
`2 98.71 12.04 97.10 11.73 54.57
avg. 98.83 74.07 97.70 73.67 85.88
min max 98.73 75.88 97.43 75.56 86.66
LeNet
natural 99.17 18.16 97.56 15.23 57.86
`∞ 99.27 93.60 98.74 93.26 96.17
`2 99.43 34.30 98.49 26.89 66.39
avg. 99.29 90.69 98.89 90.34 94.79
min max 99.35 90.81 98.74 90.21 94.78
(b) (`∞ , `2) = (0.2, 1.0)
Acc. Acc-`∞ Acc-`2 Accmaxadv Acc
avg
adv
98.30 3.65 72.39 1.17 39.01
98.29 78.15 93.28 77.95 85.71
98.98 36.02 94.39 34.68 65.20
98.72 73.97 94.63 73.70 84.30
98.72 75.18 94.29 74.92 84.74
9.16 18.24 89.97 15.36 54.10
99.28 93.51 96.49 93.13 95.00
99.50 63.48 96.62 57.94 80.05
99.40 89.39 96.94 89.02 93.16
99.31 90.82 97.20 90.56 94.01
(c) (`∞ , `2) = (0.2, 1.5)
Model Opt. Acc. Acc-`∞ Acc-`2 Accmaxadv Acc
avg
adv
MLP
natural 98.39 2.77 35.70 2.32 19.23
`∞ 98.34 78.96 85.94 77.42 82.45
`2 99.00 60.37 89.96 59.82 75.16
avg. 98.61 75.01 88.85 74.76 81.93
min max 98.76 75.66 88.78 75.33 82.22
LeNet
natural 99.22 14.31 67.69 12.34 41.00
`∞ 99.22 93.76 91.11 90.26 92.43
`2 99.35 79.92 93.27 77.39 86.60
avg. 99.31 89.26 93.29 88.77 91.28
min max 99.40 89.83 92.96 89.00 91.39
(d) (`∞ , `2) = (0.2, 2.0)
Acc. Acc-`∞ Acc-`2 Accmaxadv Acc
avg
adv
98.30 2.70 13.86 0.85 8.28
98.08 77.70 69.17 66.34 73.43
98.72 70.03 81.74 69.14 75.88
98.62 75.09 79.00 72.23 77.05
98.59 75.96 79.15 73.43 77.55
99.25 17.93 39.32 17.57 28.63
99.18 93.80 78.97 78.80 86.39
99.22 85.84 87.31 84.06 86.58
99.22 88.96 85.59 84.29 87.28
99.32 89.21 85.98 84.82 87.60
(e) (`∞ , `2) = (0.2, 2.5)
Model Opt. Acc. Acc-`∞ Acc-`2 Accmaxadv Acc
avg
adv
MLP
natural 98.31 3.37 6.02 2.27 4.70
`∞ 98.25 77.91 51.28 49.40 64.59
`2 98.10 73.94 70.01 67.66 71.97
avg. 98.47 75.35 64.39 63.37 69.86
min max 98.44 75.48 66.12 64.99 70.80
LeNet
natural 99.23 15.25 16.08 11.16 15.67
`∞ 99.18 94.09 60.18 58.47 77.13
`2 98.94 87.57 78.45 78.42 83.01
avg. 99.10 89.88 74.68 74.39 82.28
min max 99.21 88.88 74.97 74.42 81.93
(f) (`∞ , `2) = (0.2, 3.0)
Acc. Acc-`∞ Acc-`2 Accmaxadv Acc
avg
adv
98.24 2.92 2.42 1.54 2.67
98.35 79.15 32.58 31.23 55.86
97.55 73.86 58.24 57.83 66.05
98.17 75.07 49.75 49.49 62.41
98.10 74.71 50.45 50.54 62.58
99.24 13.76 4.74 2.57 9.25
99.30 93.14 39.48 32.93 65.81
98.55 87.87 68.69 68.34 78.28
99.10 89.19 59.87 60.01 74.53
99.01 88.93 61.15 60.76 75.04
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Table A8: Interpretability of domain weight w for universal perturbation to multiple inputs on MNIST (Digit
0 to 4). Domain weight w for different images under `p-norm (p = 0, 1, 2,∞) and two metrics measuring
the difficulty of attacking single image are recorded, where dist. (`2) denotes the the minimum distortion of
successfully attacking images using C&W (`2) attack; min (`∞) denotes the minimum perturbation magnitude
for `∞-PGD attack.
Image
Weight
`0 0. 0. 0. 0. 1.000 0.248 0.655 0.097 0. 0.
`1 0. 0. 0. 0. 1.000 0.07 0.922 0. 0. 0.
`2 0. 0. 0. 0. 1.000 0.441 0.248 0.156 0.155 0.
`∞ 0. 0. 0. 0. 1.000 0.479 0.208 0.145 0.168 0.
Metric dist.(C&W `2) 1.839 1.954 1.347 1.698 3.041 1.545 1.982 2.178 2.349 1.050
min (`∞) 0.113 0.167 0.073 0.121 0.199 0.167 0.157 0.113 0.114 0.093
Image
Weight
`0 0. 0. 0.613 0.180 0.206 0. 0. 0.223 0.440 0.337
`1 0. 0. 0.298 0.376 0.327 0. 0. 0.397 0.433 0.169
`2 0. 0. 0.387 0.367 0.246 0. 0.242 0.310 0.195 0.253
`∞ 0.087 0.142 0.277 0.247 0.246 0. 0.342 0.001 0.144 0.514
Metric dist.(C&W `2) 1.090 1.182 1.327 1.458 0.943 0.113 1.113 1.357 1.474 1.197
min (`∞) 0.075 0.068 0.091 0.105 0.096 0.015 0.090 0.076 0.095 0.106
Image
Weight
`0 0. 1.000 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.909 0. 0.091
`1 0. 1.000 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.843 0. 0.157
`2 0. 0.892 0. 0. 0.108 0. 0. 0.788 0. 0.112
`∞ 0. 0.938 0. 0. 0.062 0. 0. 0.850 0. 0.150
Metric dist.(C&W `2) 1.335 2.552 2.282 1.229 1.884 1.928 1.439 2.312 1.521 2.356
min (`∞) 0.050 0.165 0.110 0.083 0.162 0.082 0.106 0.176 0.072 0.171
Image
Weight
`0 0.481 0. 0.378 0. 0. 0. 0.352 0. 0. 0.648
`1 0.690 0. 0.310 0. 0. 0. 0.093 0.205 0. 0.701
`2 0.589 0.069 0.208 0. 0.134 0.064 0.260 0.077 0. 0.600
`∞ 0.864 0. 0.084 0. 0.052 0.079 0.251 0.156 0. 0.514
Metric dist.(C&W `2) 2.267 1.656 2.053 1.359 0.861 1.733 1.967 1.741 1.031 2.413
min (`∞) 0.171 0.088 0.143 0.117 0.086 0.100 0.097 0.096 0.038 0.132
Image
Weight
`0 0. 0. 0.753 0. 0.247 0. 0. 0. 1.000 0.
`1 0.018 0. 0.567 0. 0.416 0.347 0. 0. 0.589 0.063
`2 0. 0. 0.595 0. 0.405 0.346 0. 0. 0.654 0.
`∞ 0. 0. 0.651 0. 0.349 0.239 0. 0. 0.761 0.
Metric dist.(C&W `2) 1.558 1.229 1.939 0.297 1.303 0.940 1.836 1.384 1.079 2.027
min (`∞) 0.084 0.088 0.122 0.060 0.094 0.115 0.103 0.047 0.125 0.100
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Table A9: Interpretability of domain weight w for universal perturbation to multiple inputs on MNIST (Digit
5 to 9). Domain weight w for different images under `p-norm (p = 0, 1, 2,∞) and two metrics measuring
the difficulty of attacking single image are recorded, where dist. (`2) denotes the the minimum distortion of
successfully attacking images using C&W (`2) attack; min (`∞) denotes the minimum perturbation magnitude
for `∞-PGD attack.
Image
Weight
`0 0. 0.062 0.254 0. 0.684 0.457 0. 0. 0.542 0.
`1 0.131 0.250 0. 0. 0.619 0.033 0.157 0.005 0.647 0.158
`2 0.012 0.164 0.121 0. 0.703 0.161 0.194 0. 0.508 0.136
`∞ 0.158 0.008 0.258 0. 0.576 0.229 0.179 0. 0.401 0.191
Metric dist. (`2) 1.024 1.532 1.511 1.351 1.584 1.319 1.908 1.020 1.402 1.372
min (`∞) 0.090 0.106 0.085 0.069 0.144 0.106 0.099 0.0748 0.131 0.071
Image
Weight
`0 0.215 0. 0. 0.194 0.590 0.805 0. 0. 0.195 0.
`1 0.013 0. 0. 0.441 0.546 0.775 0. 0. 0.225 0.
`2 0.031 0. 0. 0.410 0.560 0.767 0. 0. 0.233 0.
`∞ 0. 0. 0. 0.459 0.541 0.854 0. 0. 0.146 0.
Metric dist. (`2) 1.199 0.653 1.654 1.156 1.612 2.158 0. 1.063 1.545 0.147
min (`∞) 0.090 0.017 0.053 0.112 0.158 0.159 0.020 0.069 0.145 0.134
Image
Weight
`0 0.489 0. 0. 0.212 0.298 0.007 0.258 0.117 0.482 0.136
`1 0.525 0.190 0. 0.215 0.070 0.470 0.050 0.100 0.343 0.038
`2 0.488 0.165 0. 0.175 0.172 0.200 0.175 0.233 0.378 0.014
`∞ 0.178 0.263 0. 0.354 0.205 0.258 0.207 0.109 0.426 0.
Metric dist. (`2) 1.508 1.731 1.291 1.874 1.536 1.719 2.038 1.417 2.169 0.848
min (`∞) 0.110 0.125 0.089 0.126 0.095 0.087 0.097 0.084 0.135 0.077
Image
Weight
`0 0. 0. 1.000 0. 0. 0.246 0. 0. 0. 0.754
`1 0. 0.180 0.442 0.378 0. 0.171 0. 0. 0. 0.829
`2 0. 0.298 0.593 0.109 0. 0.330 0. 0. 0. 0.670
`∞ 0. 0.377 0.595 0.028 0. 0.407 0. 0. 0. 0.593
Metric dist. (`2) 1.626 1.497 1.501 1.824 0.728 1.928 1.014 1.500 1.991 1.400
min (`∞) 0.070 0.153 0.156 0.156 0.055 0.171 0.035 0.090 0.170 0.161
Image
Weight
`0 1. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.665 0.331 0. 0.004
`1 0.918 0. 0.012 0. 0.070 0. 0.510 0.490 0. 0.
`2 0.911 0. 0.089 0. 0. 0. 0.510 0.490 0. 0.
`∞ 0.935 0. 0.065 0. 0. 0. 0.665 0.331 0. 0.004
Metric dist. (`2) 1.961 1.113 1.132 1.802 0.939 1.132 1.508 1.335 1.033 1.110
min (`∞) 0.144 0.108 0.083 0.103 0.079 0.041 0.090 0.103 0.083 0.044
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